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THOMAS A. MARSCHAK
THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
OF THE $3.7 billion spent by private industry on research and develop-
ment in 1953, about 4 per cent, the National Science Foundation
estimates,1 went to basic research.2 A breakdown of the remainder by
categories related to the degree of "appliedness" does not yet exist.
It is safe to say, however, that a large proportion went to the develop-
ment of what have come to be called systems.
There is no accepted unambiguous definition of a system. To call it
a collection of interrelated components seems inadequate, for that is
true of the simplest gadgets, down to the safety pin. Nor is it satisfac-
tory to say that, compared to basic research, the uncertainties in
developing a system are negligible and the goals precise. For, while a
system is based on established principles which are the outputs of
basic research, the difficulty of applying them to achieve a given
performance goal may be highly uncertain, so that an initially selected
goal may be substantially revised as development proceeds. Moreover,
a system development project is generally larger than the average
basic research project and more, in a sense, is at stake: in a system
project a commitment may be based on a conjecture (about nature)
whose uncertainty is negligible by the standard of basic research.
But where, in a basic research project, a commitment might be an order
for a dozen Bunsen burners, in a system project it is likely to be the
task assignment of a large team of engineers, and sometimes it is
heavy investment in production facilities. The uncertainties of system
development may be niggling and prosaic compared to the deep
mysteries of basic research, but it is urgent, all the same, to assess them
carefully.
For our purpose it will suffice to think of a system as a complex
aggregation of components, based on established principles. An air-
craft is a system, and so are a color television set, a telephone exchange,
1Science and Engineering in American Industry, Final Report on a 1 953—1954 Survey,
NationalScience Foundation, 1956, Table A-13.
2Definedby the National Science Foundation as "Projects which are not identified
with specific product or process applications, but rather have the primary objective of
adding to the over-all scientific knowledge of the firm" (ibid,p.18).
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and a synthetic fiber plant. The established principles permit the con-
fident assertion that (1) for some effort, or (2) for no effort, however
large, the system can be made to attain a given performance. Know-
ledge of the effort needed in case (I) varies widely in accuracy from
system to system and so, consequently, does the precision with
which performance goals are specified when development of the sys-
tem begins.
There is no need to go into the normative and positive questions
about industrial research and development (and hence about technical
change) for which a better understanding of system development is
important. A major one: what is "efficient" system development and
is it observed in American industry? The empirical study of system
development could take at least three forms: an analysis, industry
by industry, of relevant aggregates; a comparison of the conduct of
system development as between industrial laboratories; or an examin-
ation of a number of system development projects in a variety of
laboratories. Data for all three approaches are difficult to obtain.
We are concerned here with the third approach: the intensive historical
study of completed system development projects.
A sufficient number of such studies, over a sufficiently wide range of
industries and project sizes, could help to provide first answers as to
what sorts of development strategies and what types of project organ-
ization are likely to be associated with "successful" system develop-
ment. By strategies we mean rules for making decisions as the project
proceeds and knowledge is gained. The problem of measuring success
is, of course, very troublesome. We shall be content to focus on certain
observable and avoidable difficulties whose presence in the course of
a project indicates "inefficiency" or less than maximum success.
While the accumulation of case studies would help to isolate the
causes of these difficulties, some theoretical work on the nature of
systems and on good organization and strategy for system projects
would be in order as well.3 For even without the peculiar role of
uncertainty, a system would generally present a scheduling problem—
the efficient scheduling of tasks, whose complexity goes beyond the
existing results on scheduling problems arising in production.4 With
the introduction of uncertainty and of objective functions defined over
a space of system performance parameters, the problem of good
A first try at some formal theory is under way.
E.g., on assembly-line scheduling.
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strategy and organization becomes a completely new one, and a
formal statement of it, at the least, seems essential.
We shall not attempt it here. The present paper merely illustrates
the possibilities of case studies for the support of informally stated
hypotheses about the types of strategy and organization which
avoid or make likely specific types of difficulties. One case study is
presented which is consistent with one such hypothesis.
The system we shall consider was developed at the Bell Telephone
Laboratories. It is a microwave relay system for the transmission over
long distances, via a chain of relay towers, of telephone conversations
and television signals. Its development was complete and its manu-
facture had begun in 1958. The start of its development as a system can
reasonably be dated 1952. The project built up to a peak of about
ninety technical persons, and its man-power and other direct costs
are roughly estimated at $15,000,000. In the Bell Telephone Labora-
tories it was one of the largest and most complex (nonmilitary)
systems undertaken.
The materials available for the study were official project docu-
ments, informal memoranda and conference minutes, and some inter-
views. The written coverage of events was often sketchy and the time
available for interviews to fill gaps was quite limited. It seems fair to
say that for the major events in the project's history records exist (and
were examined); for the others, the records and interviews covered,
very roughly, a random sample. While it would be pleasant for the
investigator of system development to come across a project in which
a total history was kept—in which every idea, message, and decision
was recorded on a punched card—one suspects that such a project
would have drawbacks for the laboratory which, in its view, would
outweigh the investigator's joy. If informality and partial independ-
ence of technical personnel are important attributes of successful
projects, then, it may be conjectured, successful projects are far re-
moved from the extreme of the punched card and are not easy to
study. At any rate, even with the interest and cordial cooperation
with which the study was received, much of the following account
remains the writer's personal impression.
The following section gives a simplified layman's description of the
system studied (known as the TH system). The second section is an
"anonymous" history, concentrating on the general strategy of
development and avoiding any mention of who was involved. It
makes lavish use of the passive voice ("It was decided that..
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and might be the history of a one-man project. It is, of course, by no
means complete, in the sense that very many events are omitted, but
the strategy of development seems fairly portrayed. The fourth section
contains some observations about the organization of the project (who
did what). The last section is a recapitulation and a brief statement of a
hypothesis about strategy and organization of system projects with
which the case of TI-I seems consistent.
A Description of the TH System
The transmission of telephone conversations and television broad-
casts over long (transcontinental) distances has been achieved in two
ways —by coaxial cable and by microwave relay. The second method,
the later of the two to be developed, dominates the former—for a given
investment cost it provides far greater capacity (with comparable
performance). A microwave relay network is composed of towers or
repeater stations, a constant distance apart, each of which contains
equipment that receives very high-frequency signals from the adjacent
stations, equipment that amplifies the signals received, and equipment
that transmits the amplified signals to the adjacent stations. At each
end of a link in the microwave relay network originating telephone
messages and TV broadcasts are transformed into signals of very
high (microwave) frequency.
The first microwave relay system—the TD-2 system—was put into
transcontinental operation by the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company in 1951. Its microwave signals have frequencies around
4,000megacyclesper second (me/see). The TH system, with which we
are concerned, operates at frequencies around 6,000 me/sec. Its pur-
pose is to greatly augment the capacity of TD-2, and it uses much
equipment of totally new design.Its capacity is approximately
11,000 two-way telephone conversations (one television broadcast
can be substituted for each 1,860 conversations)—roughly three times
the capacity of TD-2.
We proceed now to a simplified description of TH—by a layman
for laymen—which will serve as a reference base for the historical and
organizational accounts that follow. Figure 1 provides a schematic
portrayal of the system.
Consider the transmission of telephone conversations and TV
broadcasts, via TH, from one location to another. At the first location
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telephone conversations are transformed (by equipment developed
some years before TH) into amplitude-modulated radio signals.
These signals, together with television signals (which are also AM),
are sent via cable to an AM-FM terminal. We shall trace the progress
of one signal, conveying, say, a group of telephone messages (alterna-
tively it could convey a TV program). The AM signal in question,
like all the originating AM signals, uses the frequency band from 0 to
10 mc/sec, called the base band. At the AM-FM terminal it is con-
verted, by equipment developed for TH, into a frequency-modulated
signal whose center frequency is 74.1 mc/sec, called the intermediate
frequency of i-f. The band of frequencies about the i-f, containing the
modulations of the i-f which carry the group of messages in question,
is 28 megacycles wide. This FM signal is fed, via cable, to a trans-
mitting terminal.
Herethe signal enters the transmitting modulator, where it is im-
pressed on a microwave carrier signal, whose frequency is near 6,000
mc/sec; the microwave carrier signal, in other words, is frequency
modulated so as to match (to carry the same information as) the
incoming i-f FM signal. The source of the microwave carrier signal
is a common microwave generatorwhichprovides all the microwave
carrier frequencies needed in the transmitting terminal. The modulated
microwave signal passes through a ferriteisolator(which attenuates
undesired signals reflected back from subsequent components) and
then goes to a traveling-wave-tube ampljfler; the amplified signal
finally reaches the transmitting terminal's transmitting antenna.
The microwave signal is detected at the first repeater station,
containing a receiving antenna, several repeaters, and a transmitting
antenna, and located some thirty miles away. Each repeater consists of
a receiver and a transmitter; the components of the latter are identical
with those just described for the transmitting terminal. After passing
through the repeater station's receiving antenna, through an attached
wave guide, and through a microwave filter which separates it from
adjacent signals, the microwave signal goes to one of the repeaters.
The first repeater component which it enters is an isolator (whose
general purpose is as described above). It next goes to a receiving
modulator or converter. Here it is impressed on a microwave signal
of different frequency (obtained from the repeater's common micro-
wave generator) in such a way that an FM signal at i-f emerges. The
i-f signal contains the same information as the original received
microwave signal, but like the received signal it is very weak. It is
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amplified in the i-f a trans-
mitter; the transmitter's components have already been described.5
The power needs of each repeater station are met by a power supply.
Following the final repeater station there is a receiving terminal,
containing receivers (whose components have just been described).
The amplified i-f signal which emerges is sent to an FM-AM terminal,
where it is converted to the base band AM signal, and then sent to a
telephone central office (or to a local TV transmitter if it conveys
television).
The term "signal" needs to be made more precise. TH uses the
500-megacycle-wide microwave band between 5,925 and 6,245
mc/sec. This band is divided into 16 broad-band channels, each
28 mc wide, or 8 two-way broad-band channels, each composed
of 2 nonadjacent broad-band channels. Of the 8, 6 are for regular
service and 2 are protection channels. Each two-way broad-band
channel will handle 1,860 two-way telephone conversations or
one television program.6
It will be important for our purposes to clarify further the plac-
ing of the two-way channels within the 500 mc band as well as their
use. For the scheme of channel placement or frequency allocation
was one of the major choices facing the developers of TH. Con-
sider, for example, the two-way channel whose component chan-
nels have the carrier frequencies 6,226.9 mc/sec, and 5,974.9
mc/sec when no messages are being transmitted. Now suppose
the channel's complement of 1,860 telephone messages is sent from
location A to location B via this two-way channel. This means that
at the transmitting terminal a carrier signal of 5,974.9 mc/sec is
frequency modulated—its frequency is altered at any instant of
time above or below the carrier frequency so as to convey the
information in these telephone messages. At the first repeater
station, the frequencies conveying the messages are shifted
upward (in the transmitting modulator) by 252 mc/sec, so that
the unmodulated carrier frequency becomes 6,226.9 mc/sec and
the telephone messages now cause deviations above and below
The purpose of bringing the signal down to i-f at the repeater is to facilitate channel
switching. See section below entitled "Generating Alternative Major System Characteris-
tics Consistent with the Objectives."
The widthof each channel is determined by the width of the base band and (roughly)
by the noise level to be tolerated in transmitting the information the base band signal
contains.
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this frequency. At the second repeater station the frequencies
conveying the messages are shifted down to the original band
centered at 5,974.9 mc/sec.
The alternation between the two components channels from
repeater station to repeater station continues until the receiving
terminal at B is reached. There is an analogous alternation in the
opposite direction for the other part of the telephone conversa-
tion in question: the transmission of a message from B to A. The
result is that at any repeater station one 28-mc frequency band
carrying the telephone conversations in question is received
from both directions and another (not adjacent to the first) is
transmitted in both directions. For each two-way channel, there is,
at a given repeater station, a distinct pair of transmitters and a
distinct pair of receivers. All the transmitting frequencies in the
repeater are grouped together and all the receiving frequencies
are grouped together, the two groups being separated by a guard
band 52 mc in width. The main purpose of this frequency-shift
scheme is to avoid over-reach interference, which results when
two successive repeaters transmit the same frequency band in
the same direction. Figures 2 and 3 portray the scheme.
Very efficient use of the entire 500 mc band is made possible
by cross polarization (portrayed in Figure 3). Any two adjacent
one-way broad-band channels in a repeater station's transmitting
group and any two in its receiving group are oppositely polar-
FIGURE2
Frequency Shifting: One Two-Way Broad-Band Channel, Composed of






Arrows indTcate direction of transmission.
Arrows indicate direction of transmission.
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FIGURE3
Two-Frequency Plan of Frequency Allocation, Using Cross-Polarization
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The crossing diagonal broKen lines indicate a possible two-way brood-band channel
station. Arrows indicate direction of transmission.
at a given repeater
The crossing diagonal broken lines indicate a possible two-way broad-band channel
a given repeater station. Arrows indicate direction of transmission.
ized—ifsignals in the first channel travel in
to or from the next repeater, signals in the second travel
vertical plane. This permits adjacent channels to be edge-to-edge
without interference; without cross polarization there would
have to be a guard band between two adjacent channels. Cross
polarization also makes it possible to use one receiver and one
at
transmitter for two adjacent (andoppositely polarized)one-
way channels. Thus each repeater station contains
in total eight repeaters (eight receivers and transmitters)—four
for the eight one-way broad-band channels going in one direc-
tion and four for the eight going in the other direction.
An Anonymous History of the TH Project
ORIGINS
The TELsystem has, as we have seen, a predecessor—the TD-2
microwave relay system, first put into transcontinental operation in
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It has five two-way broad-band channels; each channel's capacity is
now 600 telephone conversations or one TV broadcast. (Each chan-
nel's capacity is less, per mc of width, than in TH, primarily because
the amplifier used has much less power than TH's traveling-wave-
tube amplifier.) The original transcontinental route has been paral-
leled and additional north-south and east-west fragments have been
constructed so as to form a 25,000 mile network (densest in the
eastern half of the country).
The growth in utilization of TD-2 was predicted at its inception to be
quite steep. After the first two years of operation it was predicted that
the capacity of some of its major links would be exhausted by 1960.
The Federal Communications Commission had, in 1946, assigned to
common carriers three microwave frequency bands for telephone and
television transmission and to the Bell System the use of these three
bands by transmitters at specific locations. One band was that used
by TD-2. The remaining two were the 5,925—6,245 mc band and the
10,700—1 1,000 mc band. For accepted technical reasons7 it was decided
to use the latter band for a future short-haul feeder system and the
former for the next long-haul relay system to be developed after
TD-2.
It was clear at the time these decisions were made that a long-haul
system operating in the 6,000 mc/sec range posed a major develop-
ment task. Devices that accurately and reliably amplified signal chan-
nels in this range (each channel conveying a great deal of information)
did not exist; there were at least two approaches to such devices and
it was far from clear which was better. In addition to amplifiers,
other important components of a future system were equally prob-
lematic. The future development task was conceived, moreover, as
achieving an improvement over TD-2; it was to make more efficient
use of its frequency band.
General exploratory work relevant to microwave transmission
systems had been a continuing activity at Bell Laboratories for some
years. Experimental tubes and other devices were constantly being
built and investigated so as to provide an array of interesting com-
ponent possibilities for unspecified future microwave systems.It
seems to have been in 1949, however, that work was first specifically
directed toward the components and techniques which were then
the major puzzles of a future 6,000 me/sec long-haul system. The
Namely, that the difficulties of using the very high frequency band would be less
serious in short-haul service.
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years 1949-51wereprimarily years of resolving fundamental uncer-
tainties before the start of system planning and development.
1949-51: RESOLVING FUNDAMENTAL UNCERTAINTIES AND
IDENTIFYING OBVIOUS BOTTLENECKS
1. The most extensive uncertainties concerned traveling wave tubes
for amplification in the transmitter of a microwave relay system. The
principles of the traveling wave tube had been developed just after
World War II (largely in Britain and at Bell Laboratories) and experi-
mental models had been built as early as 1947.8 It seemed likely that
traveling wave tube amplifiers with the required characteristics in the
6,000 mc/sec range could be developed. But it was highly uncertain
how quickly the design of a satisfactory tube and an associated mag-
netic focusing structure could be found.
At the same time there existed an alternative to the traveling-wave-
tube amplifier—an amplifier based on a planar triode. Such an ampli-
fier had been developed for TD-2. There was a possibility that the
TD-2 triode could be modified9 to provide satisfactory amplification
at 6,000 mc/sec. Attempts to do so were still underway, on a small
scale, in 1949. But toward the end of 1949 the consensus was that the
traveling wave tube held the greater promise.
There was interest concurrently in a low-noise traveling wave tube,
a tube specially designed to have a much superior noise figure but a
substantially smaller gain and smaller power output than the tube
intended for the main transmitting amplifier. The low-noise tube
would be used in the receiver to amplify the received microwave
carrier signal before its conversion to an i-f signal in the converter.
This promised to decrease significantly each repeater's contribution
to the total noise in any future system in which signals were brought
8Avery crude description of the tube is as follows. An electron gun, a helix (a coil of
wire), and a collector are sealed in.a long, thin glass tube. An electromagnetic wave to be
amplified enters the tube through an input wave guide. The wave travels around the helix
towards the collector with almost the speed of light; its effective speed through the tube,
however, is less, roughly equalling the speed of the electrons which are sent through the
helix from the gun by a voltage close to 2,000 volts. (The helix, in other words, "slows
down" the electromagnetic wave by making it traverse a lengthy route to get from one
end of the tube to the other.) The electrons and the wave travel along together, with the
wave acting on the beam of electrons to group them in clusters which "match" the wave
and which, in turn, act on it so as to amplify it. The waves can be visualized as waves on
water and the electron stream as a breeze, which blows past the waves and raises them
higher and higher as they travel. The amplified signal leaves the tube through an output
waveguide. The direction of the electron stream must be very accurately maintained, and
this is the function of a magnetic focussing structure surrounding the tube.
Essentially by bringing the grid closer to the cathode.
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down to an i-f at repeaters. Both traveling wave tubes under study
through late 1951 were 4,000 me/sec tubes built to match the only
test equipment then available. It was expected that information
obtained from tests at these frequencies could later be applied to higher
frequency tubes. Only atend of 1951 did work begin on 6,000
me/sec versions of the two tubes.
2. Cross-polarization studies got under way in 1949. Cross polari-
zation was known to have promise as a means for making more
efficient use of a given microwave frequency band and experimental
data were needed to estimate the difficulties of incorporating the
techniques in the future system. Knowledge of waveguide and antenna
designs permitting efficient cross polarization was obtained.
3. Frequency allocation studies were begun, to consider alterna-
tive ways of dividing up a future system's frequency band among
channels and to deduce some of the broad requirements that each
alternative would impose on the system.
4. Effort in the years 1949—51 was also directed at identifying and
starting work on obvious potential bottlenecks which would arise in
developing a future system unless work on them preceded the start of
system development. By obvious bottlenecks we mean those that can
be prevented by performing (before the start of system development)
straightforward tasks whose magnitude is predictable with high con-
fidence. Such tasks require no innovations and are independent of
those properties of the final system which are initially very uncertain.
The chief obvious potential bottlenecks were certain items of
test equipment. Conferences in 1949 formally emphasized the
importance of these items. The highest-frequency test equipment
then existing was in the 4,000 me/sec range (largely developed
for TD-2). The absence of 6,000 me/sec test equipment was
already constraining experimental traveling wave tube work. It
would literally halt important work once a future system was in
full development. To produce a variety of test equipment at
6,000 me/see, while a fairly straightforward engineering task, was
apparently one that was sure to require substantial minimum time
periods—up to a year and a half for some items. Allocation of
more manpower to test-equipment development within the
anticipated manpower limits could not, apparently, reduce the
time required below these minima. Work on some of the major
items consequently started in 1950 and 1951.
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1952: PRELIMINARY SYSTEM PLANNING
In 1952 the planning of TH as a system began. The official authoriza-
tion of preliminary planning meant that the accumulated information
about the difficulty of developing TH, gained in the previous three
years' attack on the system's fundamental puzzles, showed it to be
certainly worth another one or two years' work at a great but still
relatively low level of intensity.'0 At the end of the period it would
be decided whether, in vi.ew of the predictions then possible about
the roughly planned system and its development effort, and in view
of the rising pressure on TD-2, a commitment to full-scale develop-
ment should be made. A (partial) alternative still remaining at the
time of that decision would be construction of additional TD-2
routes.
As a first step in planning, it was decided that TH would use the
routes and towers of TD-2 and that the components of TD-2 should
be used or adapted whenever possible. As a result of the work of
1949—51 it was also decided that microwave amplification would be
based on the traveling wave tube; that cross polarization would be
used together with an antenna type explored in 1949—51 ;" and that
shifting of frequencies would occur at repeaters, as had been the case
in TD-2.12
There then remained, at this stage, three major planning problems:
formulating broad objectives; identifying alternative sets of major
system characteristics consistent with these objectives; and formu-
lating broad requirements for certain "key" components (those likely
to require a long development time, or those that must be nearly
completed before the development of important components can
start). We shall discuss these problems in order.
Objectives
The system's purpose is to transmit information; its success in
doing so depends, essentially, on the number of messages that can be
simultaneously transmitted over any link in the system, the total noise
expected over any link, and the reliability of any link. For a given
10Roughly 78technical man-years were spent in 1952—1954 out of an estimated total
of345 spent on TH development by 1958. Further data on timepathof expenditure are
given at the endofthishistorical section.
11Horn-reflectorantennashadbeen shown during this period to be much more
efficient, especially for cross-polarization, than the delay-lens antennas of TD-2.
12Butan important choice remained as to how many frequency bands each channel
used in each direction. See below.
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development effort and a given production and operating cost of the
developed equipment, there is, in general, some scope for trade-off
among these three magnitudes. For example, if each telephone con-
versation were assigned a larger portion of a two-way broad-band
channel, a better signal-to-noise ratio could be attained, but fewer
conversations could then be fitted into the given 500 mc band. To
some extent, moreover, a greater development effort and a greater
production and operating cost can "buy" better values of one or
more of the three magnitudes.
in the early planning of the TElsystem,the objective with respect
to noise was to meet standards previously set by the Bell System for
long-haul telephone and television circuits. These specify a maximum
acceptable total noise level for any long-haul link.'3 There was a
corresponding goal with respect to messages transmitted: a minimum
of six two-way broad-band channels each carrying at least 1,800
(two-way) telephone conversations or one TV broadcast.'4 The reli-
ability goal was less precisely stated: a "very high" degree of reliability
was to be obtained by making use of protection channels (two were
planned) in addition to the six normal two-way broad-band channels.
in the event of a breakdown in an item of equipment on which a
given normal channel depends, one of the protection channels would
be switched to automatically.15 Alarm and control circuits would be
used to signal the difficulty to maintenance personnel.
How binding were these objectives? The noise objective seems to
have been the most critical. Even here, however, the vi.ew was cer-
tainly not that the entire development would be a failure should the
final system not meet the noise objective. (The TD-2 system fell a little
short of its noise objective, once fully utilized; further minor improve-
ments are possible, moreover, even after a system is in operation, and
such improvements were underway for TD-2 at the time of writing).
The attitude toward the three goals might be summarized as follows:
it seemed likely that for a reasonable development effort a system
"More precisely, a minimum signal-to-noise ratio at hours of peak system use under
average atmospheric conditions.
Thegoal of 1,800 telephone conversations per channel was reasonable, given the
base-band width—tO mc—of the AM signal whose information content is transmitted
over a channel. The 10 mc width was largely dictated by the existing equipment (developed
for a coaxial-cable long-haul system) which could combine telephone conversations
(1,800 of them, roughly) into an AM signal whose width was a bit less than 10 mc. The
choice of 10 mc was also influenced by the possibility of a future demand for transmission
of theater television, which would require a base-band of this width.
Itwill be recalled that for each two-way broad-band channel there is, at each re-
peater station, a distinct pair of receivers and a distinct pair of transmitters.
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could be obtained whose production cost was acceptable, whose noise
came close to the noise objective, and whose message capacity and
reliability were acceptably near the respective objectives (but further
than the system's noise is from the noise objective). Development
effort and production cost were to be increased, as became necessary,
to reach acceptable values of the three performance magnitudes.
Should a point in development be reached where an acceptable value
of one of them could not be attained without a drastic increase in
development effort or production cost, a decision whether or not to
sacrifice performance significantly would be required. But that would
be a bridge to be crossed when and if it appeared: there was no need
to formulate beforehand a strategy for decision in the many conceiv-
able contingencies of this sort.
No estimate of the total TH development effort was contained in the
prospectus which, in 1952, accompanied official laboratory authoriza-
tion of preliminary system planning. The prospectus did make a
prediction about production cost, namely that the first cost of TH
per channel-mile (using the existing TD-2 towers) would be about
$1.25 less than for TD-2. (This prediction turned out, as we shall see,
to be a moderate underestimate.)
Generating Alternative Major System Characteristics Consistent With
the Objectives
The objectives having been formulated, many decisions remained
as to certain important system characteristics. By a system character-
istic we mean either (1) a number (or set of numbers) that characterizes
the system (rather than any one component) but is distinct from the
magnitudes defining the objectives; or (2) the specification which of
several different ways of attaining the objectives is to be used (e.g.,
which of two possible, qualitatively different major components is to
be used to perform a certain function). Alternative sets of character-
istics consistent with the objectives were found, and choice among these
sets was subsequently to be made, It was important to generate some
alternatives at this stage, since uncertainty as to the effort required
to realize any given set of characteristics was great. To formulate any
set, however, is a costly analytical job, and many possible alternatives
were never presented.16
Thefinal choice of system characteristics may reflect what system planners are fond
of calling a "design philosophy"—i.e., a general approach to a wide class of problems
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The most important characteristic was the frequency allocation
plan. Two alternative plans were developed in 1952. One was the two-
frequency plan finally adopted (a given signal traveling in a given
direction uses two frequency bands, shifting from one to the other at
each repeater station). Thiswould allow, within the available 500 mc
space, eight two-way broad-band channels and 52 mc of guard space.
The other plan was a four-frequency plan wherein each two-way broad-
band channel uses a separate pair of frequencies for each direction
of transmission. Adjacent bands would be allowed to overlap some-
what in the latter plan but, even so, only six two-way broad-band
channels could be fitted into the 500 mc space.17 The first plan was
therefore preferable, but its feasibility depended on further advances
in the design of the antennas and the associated microwave filters.
The difficulty of these advances was very much in doubt.
Another important pair of alternatives presented in 1952 were two
repeater types. One possibility was an i-f type in which gain, regu-
lation, and frequency shift are accomplished after bringing the signal
down to i-f.18 The other possibility was an all-microwave type where
modifications of the signal are accomplished without bringing it down
to i-f. The former type is necessary in any case at main repeater stations
where channel switching'9 is required, but a choice between the types
had to be made for all other repeater stations.
A third major pair of alternatives was to use or not use a low-noise
traveling wave tube itt the receivers.
A fourth very important set of alternatives consisted of the possible
allocation of acceptable noise among major parts of the system so as
to meet the total noise objective for telephone message and TV
posed by the system. In TH, for example, such a philosophy opposed the use of "mop-
up" circuits following a component to correct undesirable distortions generated by the
component; the component was to be designed, in general, so as to make mopping up
unnecessary.
In both plans the width of each one-way channel is 28 mc. Given the width of the AM
base band other widths could have been explored (permitting more or fewer channels,
with a penalty or gain in signal-noise ratios). But developing each alternative plan and
exploring its consequences is expensive; it seemed reasonable to confine the comparison
between two and four-frequency plans to the 28 mc width. In any case, 28 mc was regarded
as a good bet for a width for which near-attainment of the noise and capacity objectives
would be a reasonable development task.
18Theprecise intermediate frequency had not yet been chosen.
I.e., switching a group of telephone conversations or a television broadcast from one
specific two-way broad-band channel to another. This occurs at stations from which
branches off the main trunk routes originate. Switching to a protection channel is a
second kind of switching. Provision for either or both kinds is needed at two out of three
stations.
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transmission. A tentative "target" allocation was chosen in 1952. The
acceptable noise contribution of central offices,terminals, and
repeaters was specified. It "added up" to the total noise objective.20
It was explicitly recognized that deviations from the target allocation
would be permitted as they arose; if it turned out to be difficult not
to exceed target noise for one source, the excess would be allowed,
provided the noise in another source could be made to fall short of
the target there by a roughly compensating amount.
Finally, a target requirement was set for system equalization. This
magnitude measures, to put it crudely, the variation, as between a
given channel's original amplitude-modulated base-band frequencies
fed into a link of the system, of the strengths with which they emerge
at the FM-AM terminal at the other end of the link, as well as their
variation with respect to phase at the other end of the link. It is an
important determinant of each channel's message capacity, given a
maximum noise level, and it depends on the performance of a number
of components. Some variation from the target value, initially set the
same for each channel, was to be admitted.
Note that the system characteristics are closely interdependent:
given the objectives to be met, and given all but one, the admissible
values of the remaining characteristic are sharply constrained.
Broad Requirements forMajor Components
Thefinal planning task to get underway in 1952wasthe formulation
of broad requirements for major components consistent with each
other, with the objectives, and with some of the alternative sets of
system characteristics.
ANTENNAS. In the preferred two-frequency plan a repeater
station N receiving a desired. frequency from repeater station
N+ 1 will also receive interfering signals from repeaters N— 1 and
N+ 1. The only known.way of discriminating against this inter-
ference is to improve antenna front-to-back ratios (very roughly
the ratio of the antenna's efficiency in receiving or radiating
20The rule for totalling the contributions is more complex than simple addition. In
addition to breaking down total noise into contributions of these three parts of the system
it was also broken down into "types" of noise (fluctuation, intermodulation, and cross-
talk noise). A given component may contribute one type of noise but not the others; the
types are equally important to the total system noise. It goes without saying that attain-
ment of a noise level for a part of the system below the target level for that part is
desirable if it can be achieved with no additional effort.
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energy in the desired direction to its efficiency in doing so in the
reverse direction). Minimum requirements for antenna front-to-
back ratios were computed such that, under the two-frequency
arrangement, the "target" for each repeater station's contribution
to system noise would be met—provided that reasonable require-
ments on other components are met.
TRAVELING WAVE TUBE AMPLIFIER.It was concluded that to
guard against fading (which can periodically occur between any
two repeater stations), while meeting the noise target for repeater
stations and the message capacity goal for channels, each repeater
should be capable of providing up to 100db of gain and its travel-
ing wave tube amplifier should have a power output of "about"
five watts.
Requirements for the low-noise tube, on which development
work was under way, were also formulated in case the alternative
of using one should be adopted.
OTHER REPEATER COMPONENTS. Requirements on other major
components of both i-f repeaters and all-microwave repeaters
were roughly sketched. Some of these components were to be
adaptations of TD-2 components, but others (e.g., the common
microwave generator, the i-f amplifier) would require substantial
development effort.
POWER SUPPLIES.Voltage requirements for each repeater
station's power supply were formulated to meet the needs of the
traveling wave tubes and other repeater components.
ALARM AND CONTROL CIRCUITS AND AUTOMATIC SWITCHING. A
description was given of proposed alarm and control circuits,
together with devices for automatic switching to protection chan-
nels. These features promised to meet the objectives for system
reliability.
To summarize: The requirements drawn up for major components
in this period were very broad and not rigid. They consisted generally
of upper and lower limits to the main component characteristics.
But they were consistent with each other, with the system objectives,
and with some of the alternative sets of system characteristics. It
could be stated with great confidence that, if major components
meeting the requirements were developed, then the system objectives
would be met. While there was considerable uncertainty about how
difficult attainment of any requirement would turn out to be, the
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requirements seemed reasonable guides for the next stage of develop-
ment. It was quite clear, however, that should a given requirement
prove difficult to meet, another one might be substituted, perhaps a
requirement consistent with different sets of system characteristics
among the alternative sets previously generated, or even with different
objectives, implying quite new system characteristics.
1953-54: CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE MAJOR SYSTEM
CHARACTERISTICS, FIRST DETAILED SYSTEM PLANNING, INITIAL
COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULING
During the next stage in the development of TH, choice between major
alternative system characteristics was made; the system was planned
in detail for the first time (including requirements for a number of
minor components); the development of major and minor compon-
ents got well under way; and target dates for the main events in devel-
opment were set. Finally, a tentative development budget was drawn
up and allocated. All these activities overlapped in time.
Choice Between Alternative Major System Characteristics
Choice between alternative sets of major system characteristics was
made possible in this stage because enough evidence had accumulated
about the development difficulties implied by each. The evidence con-
sisted of observations on experimental models of the key components
which particular alternatives would require as well as further paper
analysis of the requirements implied and the difficulty of attaining
them.
LOW-NOISE TRAVELING WAVE TUBE. A decision not to use a
low-noise tube in the receivers was made early in 1954. The
noise figure obtained in some experimental tubes was not so
low as had been hoped and at the same time the converter itself
(using a newly developed crystal) promised a much better noise
figure than anticipated earlier. Hence the advantage of incorpor-
ating a low-noise tube ahead of the converter appeared to be quite
small and not worth additional development effort.
FREQUENCY PLAN. The two-frequency alternative was chosen.
As a result of experimental work with antennas it appeared very
likely that an antenna design yielding the required front-to-back
ratios could be obtained. The precise spacing of channels was
not decided upon until the end of 1954. (Given the channel width
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of 28 mc, previously chosen, it depended essentially on the width
of the guard space between the two groups of eight one-way
channels.)
REPEATERS (OTHER THAN MAIN REPEATERS): I-F VERSUS ALL-
MICkOWAVE.The possibility of all-microwave repeaters was
rejected. The principal reasons were (1) difficulties discovered
in achieving frequency shift in such repeaters, and (2) the increas-
ingly likely prospect that, as the microwave network becomes
denser, virtually all stations will become nodes of the network and
will have to be provided with a channel switching ability.
NOISE ALLOCATION. By mid-1954 the noise objective had been
slightly relaxed from that of two years earlier and the planned
noise allocation had accordingly been changed slightly from the
earlier target allocation. Now, moreover, it was given in some-
what greater detail. The target noise from repeater stations, in
particular, was broken down into subtargets, corresponding to
several repeater components. Early design work on noise-critical
repeater components, undertaken in the intervening two years,
had made this breakdown possible.
SYSTEM EQUALIZATION. A small relaxation from the original
target was decided upon for certain specific channels and a slightly
more stringent target was set for any channel carrying color
television. The difficulty of achieving the revised targets was still
very uncertain at the end of 1954, since it depended on the per-
formance of a number of undeveloped components.
First Detailed System Planning
The end products of this period's detailed system planning were
block diagrams of the system. They showed the path of the signals from
component to component as well as specifications (requirements) for
the components, stated in greater detail than before. This required
choice of some minor system characteristics not dealt with before.
More Detailed Component Requirements
The choice of a major system characteristic was generally accom-
panied, as we have seen, by a more detailed statement of the alternative
chosen. Similarly, requirements for major components, consistent
with the chosen alternatives, were now formulated in considerably
greater detail, involving in some cases specifications to be met by
many of the smaller parts making up a major component. In addition,
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requirements were generated for minor components, not bothered
with in the previous stage of development. The level of detail, however,
was quite uneven—high for some (major or minor) components, low
for others. This occurred for two main reasons; we shall discuss each
in turn.
VARIATION IN DEVELOPMENT UNCERTAINTY OF COMPONENTS.The
greater the uncertainty as to size of development effort needed to meet
given requirements for a component, the less detailed, in general, were
(1) the requirements formulated for it in this period, and (2) the
requirements formulated for other components whose performance
closely depended on it. Requirements for the components closely
dependent on a highly uncertain component were stated broadly to
provide consistency with a wide range of possible specifications for
the component in question.
Consider, for example, the isolator and the common microwave
generator. The isolator developed was a novel solution to the prob-
lem of blocking reflections from the antenna before they reach a re-
peater to which the antenna is connected. That the material (a ferrite)
and the design would function properly became evident in 1953.
Hence, in mid-1954, a precise minimum level of attenuation of the
undesired antenna reflections was specified, as well as a maximum
acceptable forward loss (i.e., loss of strength in the signal that passes
through the isolator in the desired direction). In formulating those
component requirements whose soundness depended on isolator per-
formance, there was then no need to "hedge" to allow for alternative
levels of isolator performance.
The common microwave generator, on the other hand, was a much
more problematic component. Its critical property was reliability.
The alternative to a common generator at each repeater station was a
set of generators, one for each channel (this alternative was used in
TD-2). The common generator's chief advantage is that it greatly
reduces the number of tubes and other unreliable elements re-
quired for microwave generation (but requires a greater number of
"passive" elements). Consequently the probability of failure of any
single channel due to failure of its microwave supply at some repeater
station is greatly reduced. The probability of failure of all channels,
however, is somewhat increased, even with the use of a stand-by
common generator at each repeater. The difficulty of reducing the
latter probability to negligible levels was quite uncertain, and no
requirement for the probability was decided upon in this stage of
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development. The many possible ways of generating the needed family
of microwave frequencies2' implied different generator reliabilities and
a sufficiently wide exploration of these alternatives was far from com-
plete at the end of 1954. In particular, a judicious choice of the i-f would
make it possible to require only a small number of basic oscillator
frequencies. Combinations of these could then be found which, when
impressed on the i-f in the transmitters, yield the required family of
16 microwave carrier frequencies. The fewer the basic oscillator
frequencies the common microwave generator is required to' produce,
the simpler and more reliable is the generator. The judicious choice
of i-f was not made, however, until the end of 1954. The possibility
of separate-channel generators was, in fact, still held in reserve until
then.
VARIATION IN SYSTEM CRITICALITY OF COMPONENTS. Quite aside from
having very uncertain development difficulties, a component may be
highly "system critical"; its performance affects the appropriateness
of a great many other components. In principle (though this probably
rarely occurs in practice) a component could display virtual certainty
about its development difficulties and yet be highly system critical.
It was natural, in TH, to be particularly careful about prematurely
issuing detailed requirements for highly critical components, even
if their development difficulties were only moderately uncertain.
Choosing, at a given point in development, the appropriate level
of detail for a critical component's requirements (which are taken as
predictions about the component's final properties when planning
other components) calls for a difficult balancing of two costs. A
balance must be struck between the risk of having to revise the entire
system when detailed predictions about the component turn out to be
wrong, and the cost in total system development time of waiting to
announce predictions (requirements) until this risk is small (because
the component is already well into development). Since much depends
on a critical component, planning and development cannot proceed
without some prediction as to its final performance; but if too detailed
predictions are taken too seriously too soon, costly revisions of the
entire system are likely to be needed.
The isolator is a good example of a component which was relatively
uncritical in the above sense. The power supply was an example of a
critical component whose development uncertainties were moderate.
Thefrequencies needed were precisely determined once the two-frequency plan had
been decided on and a division of the 500mcband into channels and guard space chosen.
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The requirements on the power supply at the end of 1954 were still
very broad, not so much because its development was a puzzle but
because too much else depended on its precise performance.
Generation and Choice of Minor System Characteristics
Part of the process of formulating more detailed component require-
ments was the generation of alternative minor system characteristics
—magnitudes which are not attributes of only a single component and
which it was premature to consider in the previous stage of develop-
ment. Among such magnitudes were, for example, the intermediate
frequency and the channel guard space. The proposed alternative
characteristics had to be consistent with the chosen values of the major
characteristics. To formulate final component requirements, choice
among the alternatives had to be made, though choice could in some
cases be deferred until development of the dependent components
was already under way. (Design work on the i-f amplifier, to meet
certain requirements that did not depend on frequency, could and did
precede final choice of the i-f.)
Initial Component Development
Requirements for a number of important components having been
issued in 1953—54, the developers of these components had goals,
though they varied widely in precision. By the end of 1954, designs
of all major components had been proposed, and in several cases
hardware had been constructed. We shall discuss the development
of the principal components in the next section.
Scheduling Development and Allocating Manpower
In mid-1954 a schedule for development activities was released.
For most components it showed a date for each of four events: com-
pletion of preliminary requirements (already attained in many cases);
completion of a preliminary model (also known as a "breadboard
model"); completion of a laboratory model (also known as a "brass-
board model"); and release of manufacturing information. The
fourth event was to occur by 1957 for all components. The distinction
between the two kinds of models is difficult to characterize in a general
way. For each component, the two models serve as checkpoints—
their completion is an opportunity for a reassessment and, if this is
worthwhile, a revision of the component's specifications (a last-chance
opportunity, in the case of the laboratory model). Completion of each
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model for a component probably marks a sharp jump in knowledge
about the components, i.e., in the accuracy of predictions about
additional effort required to meet given specifications.
The schedule was a goal, in the same sense as component require-
ments were, but was probably regarded as still more likely to undergo
later changes. At the same time rough estimates were made of the
sequence of annual man-years (of technical personnel) needed to
achieve the schedule, and the allocation of manpower between
major tasks in each year. The total manpower estimates were: 53
technical man-years22 in 1954, 62 in 1955 and 1956,and59 in 1957.
1955-57:FULL-SCALE COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND
FINAL SYSTEM PLANNING
By 1955 full-scale development of all components was underway. In
1955—57 the final system plan was worked out in detail. Even the most
broadly stated component requirements issued in the preceding
period were not immutable. Part of the task of a component's devel-
opers was to be continually alert to the possibility that a reasonable
modification of the requirements might make the task of completing
the components significantly easier and to propose such modifications.
In developing some components, parallel exploration of alternative
designs, all holding promise of meeting the (tentative) requirements,
was undertaken.
We shall discuss most of the major components, but not all. The
periods considered overlap the period treated in the preceding section.
Traveling-Wave-Tube Amp! (tier
Whilethis was probably the most difficult component to devel-
op, and one of the most system critical, it was, as we have seen
above, one of the earliest to be started. The early experimental
models of the traveling-wave tube operated at the wrong fre-
quency and had many defects. In April 1953 experimental 6,000
mc/sec tubes became available, together with most of the required
items of 6,000 mc/sec test equipment, but many difficulties
remained. There were three major interrelated problem areas:
the "matching"23 of the waveguide (through which the signals to
be amplified enter the tube) to the helix; the design of a suitable
22Inobtaining these figures, a man-year for a technical assistant is counted as half of a
man-year for a member of the technical staff.
With respect to impedance.
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magnetic focusing structure surrounding the tube; and the
coupling of the amplifier to certain adjacent circuits. The require-
ments at which work in these three areas aimed were broadly
stated through 1955. The goal was an amplifier of at least 25 db
gain with a power output of about five watts24 requiring very
little adjustment and with noise characteristics and other pro-
perties "satisfactory."
By the end of 1953 two important but relatively easy decisions
had been rather firmly made: the critical properties of the
power supply for the tube had been chosen; and it had been de-
cidedtoincorporate a limiter ahead of the tube so as to remove
residual amplitude variations that would be turnedinto phase
variations by the tube. This largely left the first two ofthe above
three problem areas.
Much of the work on helix-waveguide matching had to await
the availability, in mid-1954, of a crucial item of 6,000 mc/sec
test equipment (a frequency generator for the entire 500 mc band).
This permitted extensive experiments on various tube and
waveguide designs; their general aim was wide-band matching
(over the entire 500 mc band), which would make it possible to
tune (adjust) the amplifier in the same way for all channels and
to replace tubes without retuning. This was a reaction to the
TD-2 situation where separate tuning was required for each chan-
nel and maintenance was complex. It was an early design goal for
the amplifier, but it was not a formally stated requirement, on
whose performance specification of many other parts of the sys-
tem depended. After many trials (including experiments with the
leading in and out of signals by coaxial cables and not by wave-
guide at all), a waveguide and tube design was attained (about
the end of 1955) which achieved wide-band matching and, in
combination with the magnetic focusing structure that had by then
been developed, provided the gain aimed for at acceptable noise
levels.25
The work on magnetic focusing structures was aimed at highly
accurate focusing of the electron beam26 by an easily maintainable
24Onlythe power output goal had been stated in 1952.
I.e., at noise levels such that the goal for repeater noise announced in mid-1954 could
be met, given the noise properties which now promised to characterize the other repeater
components (most of which were nearly developed).
26I.e.,at a longitudinal magnetic field parallel to the tube which is very strong relative
to the cross field (perpendicular to the tube), the ratio of the two strengths being very
precisely determined.
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structure of reasonable weight; the focusing structure of the
earliest experimental amplifiers had been very heavy and had
required complex adjustment. The design tested up to the end of
1955 had proved unsatisfactory, and it became clear that the
difficulty of the magnetic structure problem had been seriously
underestimated. The requirements the magnetic field must
satisfy in order to achieve the broad amplifier goals were still not
well understood, and magnet designs meeting given field require-
ments were unexpectedly difficult to achieve. At severalpoints
measuring equipment not previously planned turned out to be
essential and had to be quickly developed. The magnetic struc-
ture had to be shielded; a way had to be found to prevent the
powerful field of the magnet from interfering with components
adjacent to the traveling-wave-tube amplifier without disturbing
the delicate focusing of the traveling-wave-tube's electron beam.
A new approach to magnetic structure design was tried early in
1956—periodic-field focusing rather than the previous straight-
field method. The hope was that the new approach might permit
a smaller and more easily designed magnet assembly. The two
approaches were pursued in parallel throughout 1956; periodic
focusing was finally abandoned as too difficult.
Early in 1957 an amplifier design had been obtained achieving
sufficiently accurate wide-band matching and beam focusing to
attain the broad amplifier performance goals with a satisfac-
torily low maintenance effort.
To summarize, the traveling-wave-tube amplifier was critical to the
planned system and highly uncertain as to development difficulties.
It was itself a system, composed of several major and several minor
components for each of which feasible requirements consistent with
each other and with the broadly stated amplifier goals had to be
found. The first requirements decided on were those most certain of
attainment and least critical with respect to other requirements on
amplifier components (power needs, properties of the limiter to be
used ahead of the amplifier, cooling mechanism for the tube). In
developing all major parts of the amplifier, alternative approaches
were tried, some simultaneously, some successively.
The development of the amplifier ran into major unexpected diffi-
culties. But the amplifier was so critical to the system—in the stage
of development the system had already reached when these difficulties
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came to light—that the effort needed toresolve these difficulties
appeared well worthwhile. An alternative might have been a major
downward revision of the amplifier goals or the substitution of an
amplifier not based on the traveling wave tube. Such a change would
have required a major revision of the system and its development
schedule, at a cost far outweighing the expected effort of resolving
the traveling-wave-tube amplifier's difficulties. In retrospect, it might
appear that a greater exploratory effort on magnetic focusing struc-
tures should have preceded any formulation of amplifier goals for use
in planning the rest of the system. But it. may be that the strategy
pursued was generally sound (that it is a strategy the laboratory is
content to pursue, in the light of experience, in all such situations).
For it may be that the balance between the risk of system revision and
the rewards of early planning of a critical component had been
reasonably struck, and that the unexpected difficulties were improb-
able misfortunes.27
Shorter Notes on Some Other Components
I-F AMPLIFIER. Early work on a high figure-of-merit tube for
the i-f amplifier had been undertaken in 1953 and was well under
way even before the amplifier's critical requirements had been
broadly formulated. Such a tube (which provides the amplifier
with a high signal-to-noise ratio) would probably be useful in
fulfilling any performance goals. Requirements had to await the
decision as to i-f frequency and the allocation of the 500 mc band
to broad-band channels. By mid-1954 goals for the i-f amplifier
included the frequency band to be amplified,28 the amplifier's con-
tribution to total repeater noise, its gain, and its distortion charac-
teristics. It.was decided to design the amplifier so as to minimize
the dependence of distortion on tube characteristics; this would
avoid the tendency of the TD-2 system's i-f amplifier towards
variation of distortion from repeater to repeater (whose amplifier
tubes differ in age). The goals were, of course, not rigid. They
were moderately critical with respect to goals for other parts of
the system and were moderately uncertain of attainment.
Several important alternative design approaches were pursued
in developing the amplifier. The amplifier tube first adopted
27Anorganizational interpretation of the difficulties that arose with respect to the
magnetic focusing structure is given in a later section dealing with functional departments.
28Aband 28 mc wide around the chosen i-f of 74.1 mc/sec. The width of 28 mc for each
broad-band (microwave) channel had been chosen in 1952. See footnote 17, above.
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turned out to have a cathode prone to warping and an amplifier
design using a lower-performance tube and more stages was sub-
stituted. Two kinds of gain control—thermistor and grid—were
explored, in part simultaneously, and the latter adopted. Two
kinds of circuitry were explored in sequence: an attempt at printed
circuitry proved very difficult and was dropped, in mid-1955, in
favor of more conventional circuitry.
CONVERTER. Design of this component was finished early in
1954, subject to satisfactory completion of a crystal then still un-
der development. The noise goal proposed (in 1952) for a con-
verter preceded by a low-noise tube would then be more than met,
and so the low-noise tube was dropped. Subsequent system plan-
fling essentially took converter performance as given, and the
missing crystal became available, meeting expectations, in 1955.
POWER SUPPLY. Requirements for this component were chosen
quite late—in 1955. They depended on those properties of many
other components which determined the power needs of those
components. Designing a required power source was a straight-
forward task. In formulating the power requirements, however,
it was possible, to some extent, to simplify design of the power-
using circuits by requiring the supply of a large variety of voltages.
On the other hand, voltage requirements could be standardized,
but this would require more complex using circuits. After prelim-
inary study and debate, an approach in between the extremes of
no voltage standardization and complete standardization was
adopted.
FM TERMINALS, ENTRANCE LINKS, ALARM AND CONTROL CIR-
CUITS. Requirements for these components, like requirements
for the power supply, were highly dependent on the system but
were not uncertain with respect to development difficulty.
Requirements for them were not chosen until well into 1955,
and development was completed 1n 1956 and early 1957. Since
the size of the development effort for these components was accur-
ately predictable and goals for them could not be accurately
specified until the system was well under way, the postponement
of their development was reasonable.
Final System Planning and the Completion of System Development
By the middle of 1958 the block diagrams of the system had
taken their final form and the component specifications had
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been completely filled in. Manufacturing information for nearly
all components had been released and the remainder would
shortly follow. The system displayed only very minor departures
from the original system objectives. The system's production
and operating costs will also be close, it appears, to predictions
made in 1954.
With .respect to the development schedule presented in 1954, there
had been "slippage" for some components (particularly the traveling-
wave-tube amplifier), but none of it much more than six months. The
1954 prediction as to manpower (and hence development cost), had,
however, proven substantially optimistic. The actual total technical
manpower used was roughly as follows: 56 man-years in 1954 (55
were predicted); 72 man-years in 1955 (62 predicted); 90 in 1956
(62 predicted); 88 in 1957 (59 predicted); and 95 in 1958. It would
appear that the goal for total development effort was much more
willingly sacrificed than the development schedule, and the latter
more willingly modified than the objectives and the production and
operating costs. The unplanned increase in development effort,
moreover, seems to have been sufficient to "absorb" the system's
unexpected difficulties, since the other goals did not need to be
significantly relaxed.
Organization of TH Development
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
Of the three major departments of the Bell Telephone Laboratories—
Research, Development, and Systems Engineering—the latter two
played a part in developing TH: The general function of the Systems
Engineering Department is continually to explore the needs of the
Laboratories' customers—the operating telephone companies—while
at the same time keeping closely in touch with the technical possibili-
ties for meeting these needs. From time to time this function culmin-
ates in a formal proposal, described in a prospectus, for a specific
system to be developed. In consultation with the Systems Engineering
Department and the Laboratories' management, A. 1. and T. (the
principal prospective user of the system) and Western Electric (its
manufacturer) decide whether or not the Laboratories should be
authorized to develop the proposed system. This is an economic
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decision, making use of forecasts in the prospectus about develop-
ment time and cost, production and operating costs, and system per-
formance. Generally, the forecasts as to development time and cost
are the most cautiously worded and are violated with least regret. It
is deeply understood by all parties to the decision that the final
system performance and production and operating costs corres-
ponding to a given development effort are initially uncertain.
In the case of TH, two or three persons from Systems Engineering
prepared the first prospectus (in 1952), based on preliminary studies
performed by personnel of Development. The prospectus estimated
future demand for long-haul service and the operating savings which
could be expected from TH, using existing TD-2 routes, as compared
with building new TD-2 routes. After the prospectus appeared, the
management of the Laboratories, A. T. and T., and Western Electric
authorized initial development at a low level of intensity for two years
(an upper limit on the technical man-years to be used was, in effect,
imposed). In 1954 a second prospectus appeared. It made much more
specific predictions, in the light of the work performed (in the Devel-
opment Department) in the intervening years, about the final system
and the development effort required. The development schedule
described above was included. The same authorities who had approved
the 1952 commitment now authorized completion of the TH develop-
ment; they considered it sufficiently likely that the objectives described
in the new prospectus could be closely approached for the predicted
development time and cost. Some deviation from the latter, i.e., from
the approved annual manpower targets (increasing over the project's
remaining years), would be acceptable.
It is largely within the Development Department of the Labora-
tories that TH was developed and it is the organization of the task
within that Department that we shall examine.
ORGANIZATION OF TH WITHIN THE DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT
Two broad classes of engineers were engaged in developing TH—the
planners of the system and the developers of its components.29 A TH
System Analysis Group composed of planners was created in 1952,
at the origin of the system, and maintained throughout its develop-
ment. Its early function was to generate major system characteristics
and rough block diagrams (showing the parts of the system and what
29Someindividuals, of course, belonged to both classes.
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each "does" to the signal transmitted, as well as broad specifications
for major components). Its continuing task was to modify all of these
and make them more detailed, as new knowledge appeared. The size
of the group stayed close to five persons from 1954 on.
In contrast with the systems analysis group, the identity of some of
the component groups shifts and fades through the years. Personnel
switch back and forth between related components and some com-
ponent groups appear to merge completely. This reflects not only the
arbitrariness of any division of the system into components, but also
a conscious policy, to be detailed below, of assigning broad compon-
ent goals and encouraging the freest communication (and, to some
extent, the making of agreements) between related groups.
The systems analysis group's role was not that of central decision
making authority, issuing instructions to the component groups.
Formal authority rested with what we may call an executive group of
two or three individuals—the project engineer, the head of the sec-
tion (Transmissions Systems) of the Development Department in
which the bulk of TH effort took place, and (though he seldom.
exercised authority) the head of Development or his deputy.
The Organizational Ideal for TH
An ideal pattern, at which the formally designated leaders of TH
seemed consciously to have aimed, was roughly as follows.
The systems analysis group formulates alternative major system
characteristics consistent with the objectives30 (which were formally
issued by the Systems Engineering Department after preliminary
consultation with the future developers of the system). It deduces
from these a system plan, i.e., block diagrams with tentative require-
ments for the system's major components, consistent with one or more
of the alternative sets of system characteristics and reasonable in the
lightofthe information then available about the difficulty of attaining
givenrequirements. The executivegroup approves these require-
mentsas trial goals that are good "guesses" at the final ones,and
tentatively assigns personnelto the componentgroups.Thecompon-
ent groups startworkingtoward thctentative requirements.
As soon as a component group is ableto makea more confident
estimate of the effort needed to meet the requirements it so informs
The objectives themselves may later be changed, in accordance with the "trade-off"
possibilities mentioned earlier; in the case of TH, as we have seen, this did not happen to
a significant extent.
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the executive group. It is, moreover, not only permitted but actively
encouraged to tell the executive group as soon as it has evidence that
a minor modification of its requirements (or a joint modification of
its requirements and those of a related component group) would
significantly ease its task (or the joint task of the two groups). This
information from the component groups forms the basis for a series
of "parliamentary" conferences, presided over by the executive
group, with members of the component groups and the systems analy-
sis group as participants. The conferences achieve a consensus as to
the requirements for which modification should be attempted, as to
a new tentative allocation of manpower3' among groups and over
time, and as to a tentative time schedule for completion of successive
stages in each group's task.
The systems analysis group then works out the proposed modifica-
tion of the system plan; the modification may call for replacing some
of the system characteristics of the first plan with previously generated
alternatives. Accompanying the modification, there is a greater detail-
ing of major component requirements and the introduction of minor
requirements. Both may be further modified later on, requiring, in
turn, a further modification of the system plan and perhaps a further
reallocation of manpower and a revision of schedules. The further
changes are again settled in parliamentary conferences.
At all stages the executive group is easily accessible to the com-
ponent groups. In the traditional informality of the Development
Department (housed in a single building), conversations (face-to-
faceor bytelephone) are generally as easy to arrange between mem-
bersof'differentgroups as between members of thesame group. The
membersof the executive group, moreover,keep very well informed
aboutthe activities ofthe component and systems analysis groups,
becoming,on occasion, part of certainofthese groupsworking
directly with them, for example, in compiling the evidence in favor
of modifying their requirements. The executives might better be
thought of, in fact, as central storers of information than as makers of
decisions. Their knowledge of the status of all parts of the system is
essential to decisions about changes in requirements, manpower
allocations, and schedules, but the decisions are collectively made by
the members of the parliamentary conferences (though formally
Thatis, an allocation of the annual total manpower availabilities (increasing over
the life of the project) approved by the laboratory management. These availabilities are
"targets," which may later be revised if the system's progress should be slower or faster
than anticipated.
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issued, in memoranda or other documents, in the name of an execu-
tive).
Each component group is free to pursue its own ideas about the
internal design of its component, exploring parallel approaches (or
several approaches in sequence) if it wishes.
Finally, in the ideal organizational pattern, the relations between
groups working on related components are very close. Each group
can easily inform itself (and is kept informed through generally dis-
tributed memoranda) of the work of a related group; it does not need
to proceed through the executive group in acquiring such information.
Two related groups are encouraged to explore together designs for
the two related components which would lessen their joint effort in
meeting their (tentative) assigned goals, as well as to propose mutually
compensating changes in these goals that would leave the system no
worse off.
Among the better documented component developments in
which the ideal organization pattern was closely approximated,
several stand out.(1) Once the basic requirements for the
common microwave generator—the frequencies it was to gener-
ate—were decided on, there remained a number of other require-
ments, which were tentatively chosen. The most troublesome one
dealt with unwanted "tone products" (extraneous frequencies).
A series of memos and minutes of conferences reveals the pro-
cess of refining the requirement on tone products to obtain one
that reasonable effort can achieve and the process of adjusting
the system plan accordingly. (2) There is a similar process with
respect to the more detailed requirements given the antenna
design group. (3) There are memoranda from the executive group
to the test equipment group documenting the ordering of test
equipment and containing sentences such as this: "Any of these
requirements that appear unduly difficult should be brought to
our attention for possible modification." (4) The i-f amplifier
group explored, as we saw, two major circuitry approaches.
The idea for the first approach and the decision to drop it and
puthue the second originated within the group.
There were, of course, continual minor exceptions to the ideal
pattern—minor requirement modifications and minor reallocations
of manpower, which appear in retrospect desirable, were thought of
by component groups but never acted upon.
541EFFICIENCY IN R AND D
Functional the Major Exception to the "Ideal" Pattern
The major exceptions to the ideal pattern occurred with respect to
some (but not all) of the functional departments (within the Develop-
ment Department) that worked on TH. These are departments that
perform specialized development tasks for all systems under develop-
ment. The principal ones, in the case of TH, were the tube depart-
ment, the magnetic devices department, the solid-state devices
department (which developed the converter crystal), and the test-
equipment department. During the TH development, these depart-
ments had to work on components for other systems than TH. The
allocation of such a department's manpower to TH work, given the
competing needs of other systems and the current total manpower
targets for TH, was generally settled by negotiation between the
head of the functional department and the TH executive group.
Occasionally, one of the two or three executives of the Development
Department was called upon to arbitrate. The solution sometimes
involved assignment of TH personnel from outside the functional
department to work with the functional department so that the total
TH manpower target was not exceeded and the functional department
was able to meet its competing needs.
Communication between the members of the functional depart-
ments working on TH and the groups working exclusively on TH,
and vice versa, seems to have been, on significant occasions, more
difficult than communication 'between the latter groups. This seems
to have been because, in the first place, consultations on matters
that held implications for the reallocation of manpower within the
functional department often had to involve the head of the iu,ic-
tional department—to whom its TH workers were responsibleand
to be arranged through him. In the second place, a casual survey
suggests that members of the functional department had their own
internal loyalties and interests; they may sometimes have been
motivated less by the specific desire to make TH work well than by
the desire to perfect the devices which were their specialty inde-
pendently of this particular using system. Communication by a
functional department's TH workers of tentative notions for im-
proving the component they were developing in the specific context
of TH may have been less spontaneous and frequent than was true
of the other TH groups. -
Functionaldepartments exist in a laboratory, however, because of
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the advantages they possess. There are distinct economies of scale
in combining all development work on certain devices, versions of
which are required again and again by many systems, into one devel-
opment group. Moreover, it is an important Bell Laboratories policy
to prepare for the systems of the future by developing and placing
"on the shelf" laboratory models of components with new and
interesting properties. This is a major responsibility of most of the
functional departments. Whether these advantages outweigh the
difficulties that some system projects experience in dealing with those
departments is an important question, on which a single case study
can shed no light.
In the history of TH there are several fairly well documented
instances of major exceptions to the ideal organizational pattern
resulting from a functional department's participation in the system
project. The best documented instance centers around the magnetic
focusing structure of the traveling-wave-tube amplifier. As we have
seen, the task of developing an acceptable structure proved to be
unexpectedly difficult. The problem had been entrusted to a functional
department—a magnetic devices department which was simultaneous-
ly assisting other system projects. At the same time, developing the
traveling-wave tube itself was primarily the responsibility of a group
within another functional department—the tube development depart-
ment. The magnet difficulties, when they arose, were partially attri-
buted by the TH executives to insufficient allocation of manpower to
magnetics and to poor coordination between the magnetics and tube
groups (for example, the problem of physically mounting the mag-
netic structure on to the tube had been given insufficient attention,
according to the TH executives). The TH executives were coming to
feel that the magnetics work should be done not within a functional
department but rather by a group set up to work exclusively on TH.
A series of conferences took place, attended by the TH executives,
the heads of the two functional departments, and the principal
developing engineers concerned. The outcome was as follows: mag-
netic structure work was to continue as a permanent functional
responsibility and the TH project was to have its own temporary
magnetics group (for which new manpower was authorized32), inde-
pendent of the functional group. It was the TH magnetics group that
32Theadditional manpower would eventually show up as a small permissible increase
in total target manpower unless compensated for by decreased use of manpower in other
parts of the system.
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developed the structure finally used in TH. The minutes of the final
conference make the case for preserving the general functional
responsibility thus:
In considering the assignment of responsibility the following
factors need to be weighed. The magnetic structure is an intri-
cate and highly specialized kind of unit. It is an entity which has
well defined natural boundaries. Design as well as exploratory
work calls for highly specialized skills, which usually take a
long time to develop, and also complicated and expensive testing
gear. The same skills and equipment are probably needed to clear
difficulties which might arise in production or in the field.
Units of this kind will probably be required for projects which
may be undertaken in a number of different locations in the Labor-
atories' organization and at different times. It is therefore desir-
able that the functional responsibility for these units reside in a
single permanent organization. The alternative would be to set
up essentially small magnetics groups and it is unlikely that
these could retain a continuity of personnel or interest over an
extended period of time.
The compromise reached in the case of TH, in other words, was not
to be the general pattern for the future.
Some Difficulties Not Observed in the THProject
Except for the difficulties associated with functional departments,
the history of TH exhibits very few troubles which an organization
patterned after a different ideal could have avoided. In particular, it
fails to exhibit significantly the following troubles.
(1) Unnecessary effort, directed at (a) meeting requirements which
are very difficult to fulfill and which could be modified to become
easier without worsening the system, but are not; or (b) refinements
of component design so as to exceed the requirements that suffice
for satisfactory system performance33; or (c) unneeded parallel
approaches to the component in question—approaches which do not
serve to hedge against uncertainty since there exists a straightforward
"That is, refinements that either (1) permit attainment of system performance magni-
tudes superior to those chosen as system objectives but only at an effort which would
not be considered worth making if the option arose as a conscious choice facing those
responsible for the system's development; or (2) do not improve the performance
magnitudes beyond those chosen as system objectives.
544STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATION
predictable approach to designing the component so as to meet
requirements.
(2) What appears ex post as a more or less chaotic scheduling of
tasks—some tasks being finished long before the information they
provide is needed, while the start of others has to await the corn-
plelion of still other tasks that could have been started earlier.
(3) The performance of component work that turns out to be use-
less because the component in question poorly "matches" related
components.
These troubles have been observed in other system development
projects.34 While they require much further study it is fairly clear that
their organizational pattern is different from the ideal pattern the
TH project attempted to approximate. In important cases the pattern
is something like the following. A system is planned at an early stage
in considerable detail by a central authority. The authority schedules
individual tasks and assigns them, together with an initial manpower
allocation, to groups who, from lack of instructions to do so or
because communication with the central authority is difficult, rarely
question their assignments or suggest modifications. This leads to the
difficulties described under 1.
Moreover, the original detailed plan and schedule rest on predic-
tions about the outcome of each group's effort. These predictions
often turn out to be wrong, but the enforced insularity of each group
makes it hard for the central authority to "catch" a bad prediction
as to the difficulty of reaching an original goal until the group has
expended considerable effort toward it. The group may have guessed
at the magnitude of the predictive error some time earlier but does
not bother the central authority until the situation is serious. At that
point it may be possible to salvage the original system plan and
schedule by a massive injection of manpower into the group in ques-
tion, or it may be better to relax the goal of the group in question and
make compensating adjustments in the rest of the system plan. In
either case there is an additional cost or delay not expected when the
original plan and schedule were approved, and the troubles 2 and 3
appear in the project's history.
Thus a project organization in which a central authority makes all
the system decisions and parcels out tasks to groups who try to per-
form them in comparative isolation seems to make the project more
susceptible than does the organizational pattern approximated by
Notably certain military ones with which the writer has acquaintance.
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TH to the major difficulties observers have noted in system projects—
overstaffing (unnecessary effort), and gambles which expensively fail
(heavy commitments to system plans and schedules based on unreliable
initial knowledge).35
A project so organized might perhaps have advantages over one
like TH in the luckiest possible case. If all predictions turned out
exactly right, and a highly detailed plan and schedule had been based
on them, then each group's initially assigned task would be precisely
fulfilled. There would be no need for any communications apparatus
to link the groups with the central authority, and no need for a sys-
tems analysis group to stand by, ready to work out modifications of
the plan if they become necessary. But such lucky cases are rare
indeed.
Conclusion
The essential features of the general strategy of development portrayed
in the history may be briefly sketched as follows. The laboratory
management decides on a ranking over the space of system perform-
ance magnitudes and system production and operating costs. It may be
a very coarse ranking: there may be indifference within very large
regions of the space. Corresponding to each region, nevertheless, is
a maximum development effort (defined by a time path of expendi-
ture, or perhaps a number of indifferent time paths), which the
management is willing to expend in order to reach the region. There
are generally several regions for which there is a relatively high
confidence of attainment for not more (but not much less) than the
associated maximum admissible effort. One of these regions is ini-
tially chosen as goal.
Within the chosen region, an initial set of performance magnitudes
is then chosen as system objectives. The number of ways of attain-
ing them may be enormous and only a few can be explored. First
are considered several "families" of ways, each family defined by a
Afurther phenomenon that some have observed in certain system projects is the
growth of project staffs, from project to project within a laboratory, in accordance with
some sort of Parkinson's Law, each increment in staff depending as much on previous
size of staff as on the minimum effort actually required to complete the new project. If the
type of project organization just described leads to the difficulties1to 3, the project
planners may decide that the only way to avoid these difficulties in the future is to be more
liberal with manpower. This tends, however, to make the difficulties described under I
more likely, since more manpower is now available for "unnecessary effort." Thus growth
according to the Law may begin.
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set of system characteristics. Bit by bit, each family considered is
narrowed, as the alternative component specifications consistent
with each family are explored and knowledge of their difficulty is
gained (using parallel design approaches to them where there is
much uncertainty). Gradually a choice of family and of one way
(one set of component specifications) within that family is made.
Until the final choice is made, flexibility is maintained. Commit-
ments of personnel to specific tasks are made only for small periods,
and it continues to be generally easy to drop one family or one way
and to shift effort to exploring another more intensively. (Commit-
ments are kept particularly small while awaiting sharp jumps in
knowledge, such as completion of "breadboard" models may pro-
vide.) An exception are system-critical component specifications,
which are "frozen" somewhat before the complete system is specified
(before the final way is chosen), but only after a careful balancing of
the risks and the gains. In the background remains, until the final
choice, the possibility of changing the system objectives or even the
region of indifference aimed for. When the system is finally specified,
a schedule for the remaining development tasks is drawn up (to
choose a good one, for a complex system, may be quite difficult).
A strategy of this sort—pursued against a background of continu-
ally accumulating experimental data and components, placed "on
the shelf" for future systems—is necessary, we conjecture, if a given
stream of expenditures on system development is to yield a stream of
"successful" systems. A successful system project is one in which
there are no major revisions at great cost—of which it cannot be said
that much less effort would have been needed to attain the per-
formance realized if only certain commitments had awaited knowledge
gained latçr in the system's development. An alternative strategy—
early and massive commitment to one set of objectives and com-
ponent specifications and one system schedule—will yield significantly
more unsuccessful projects for the same expenditure stream.3°
These opposing strategies could be pursued, in principle, by a
single man working on a project all his own. When other persons are
One recent study concerns a planning tool to be used when this alternative strategy is
followed. Development of a very complex system is considered as the completion of a
huge array of highly specified tasks; the tool permits their efficient scheduling. Nowhere
is the possibility considered that some of these tasks may turn out to be the "wrong" ones.
See D. G. Malcolm, J. H. Rosebloom, C. E. Clark, and W. Fazar, "Application of a
Technique for R and D Project Evaluation," Journal of the Operations Research Society
of America, September-October, 1959.
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brought in, a choice of organizational pattern must be made. W
further conjecture that the "ideal" organizational pattern describe
above needs to be approximated in carrying out the first strateg
described if a stream of successful projects is to be attained, wher
the term unsuccessful is now enlarged to include specifically th
difficulties (1) to (3) described above.
With this pair of informal conjectures, the experience of the TI
project seems at least consistent.
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